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interpreted the "purpose" element of
§1985(3) such that "gender-based ani-
mus" fulfilled its terms. Id. The circuit
court also referred to New York NO Wv.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). In
New York NOW, a factually similar case,
the second circuit court of appeals held
that blocking access to abortion facili-
ties that served interstate clientele vio-
lated the constitutional right to travel.
NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at
585.
In determining whether the district
court acted properly in granting the
injunction, the circuit court noted Pren-
dergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43,
50-51 (1923), as providing the appro-
priate standard of review. In Prender-
gast, the Court held that the factors to
be considered in reviewing whether
there was an abuse of discretion are the
entry, duration, and scope of the injunc-
tion. The circuit court held there was io
abuse of discretion in NO Wv. Operation
Rescue because the lower court ruling
substantially conformed to the rulings of
other circuit courts on the relevant
questions of law. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 585. The court of
appeals also found that the scope of the
injunction was reasonable because, al-
though the district court limited the
injunction to Northern Virginia for a
definitive period of time, it was implicit
in the district court opinion that the
relief was granted against particular in-
dividuals and particular acts. The circuit
court also affirmed the district court's
decision not to expand the injunction to
encompass activities tending to "intimi-
date, harass or disturb patients or po-
tential patients" on the grounds that
those activities were protected by the
first amendment. NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 584. Members of
Operation Rescue were free, by verbal
means, to attempt to persuade women
not to seek the services of abortion facil-
ities and to "'impress upon members of
society' the moral rightness and inten-
sity of their opposition to abortion." Id.
at 586 (quoting NOW v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D.
Va. 1989)).
By its ruling, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit estab-
lished that right-to-life demonstrators
could be enjoined from blocking access
to abortion and abortion related facili-
ties located in the fourth circuit jurisdic-
tion. In addition, NOW v. Operation
Rescue is significant as it holds that a
woman's right to travel cannot be in-
fringed upon by demonstrators' first
amendment rights to freedom of speech.
-Michael Scott Cohen
Illinois v. Rodriguez: WARRANTLESS
ENTRY VALID IF BASED ON THE
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A
CONSENTING THIRD PARTY
POSSESSED COMMON AUTHOR-
ITY OVER THE PREMISES
The Supreme Court recently ex-
panded the scope of third party consent
upon which government authorities may
rely when entering a defendant's home.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793
(1990), the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless entry by police was valid
when based upon the consent of a third
party whom police reasonably believed
possessed common authority over the
premises.
Gail Fischer, who previously lived
with Edward Rodriguez in his apart-
ment, was assaulted by Rodriguez and
summoned police to her mother's home
to report the assault. Facilitating Rod-
riguez's arrest, Fischer accompanied
police to Rodriguez's apartment and
consented to their entry using a key that
she possessed. The police had neither an
arrest warrant for Rodriguez nor a search
warrant for the apartment. The police
believed that Fischer had authority to
consent based upon several references
to the apartment as "our" apartment and
her statement that she had clothing and
furniture in the apartment. Upon enter-
ing Rodriguez's apartment, the police
observed drug paraphernalia and co-
caine in plain view and, discovering Rod-
riguez asleep in his bedroom, they ar-
rested him. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at
2797 (1990).
Rodriguez moved to suppress all evi-
dence seized at the time of the arrest,
claiming that Fischer had vacated the
apartment several weeks earlier and
thus no longer possessed authority to
consent to the entry. The trial court
agreed and granted Rodriguez's motion
to suppress. The Appellate Court of Illi-
nois affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme
Court denied the state's Petition for
Leave to Appeal. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
2797.
The Court began its analysis by exa-
mining United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974) and the fourth amendment's
general prohibition against warrantless
entry into a person's home. Rodriguez,
110 S. Ct. at 2797 (citing US. v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164 (1974)). In Matlock, police
officers entered premises without a war-
rant but with the consent of a third party
who, because of joint access or control
of the premises, possessed common
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at
2797 (1990) (citing U.S. v. Matlock,
415 U.S. at 171 (1974)). The Court
upheld the validity of the police entry,
reasoning that when an individual per-
mits another joint access to or control of
his home, his expectation of privacy is
lowered. However, the Matlock Court
left unresolved the issue of the validity of
a warrantless entry based upon consent
of a third party, whom the police rea-
sonably believe has common authority
to consent. Id. at 2801 (1990) (citing
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 (1974)).
The Rodriguez Court, addressing the
unresolved issue in Matlock, held that
the reasonableness, and not the cor-
rectness, of the police officers' belief in
the third party's authority to consent is
the standard by which fourth amend-
ment rights should be measured. Id. at
2800. The Court found Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) consistent
with its reasoning in Rodriguez. Rod-
riguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800 (1990). In
Stoner, the Court held that police im-
properly entered Stoner's hotel room
because it was unrealistic to believe in
the "apparent authority" of a hotel clerk.
Id. at 2801 (citing Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964)).
In distinguishing Rodriguez from
Stoner, the Court emphasized that it was
unreasonable for police to believe that a
hotel clerk possessed common author-
ity to consent to an entry, whereas
Fischer may have appeared to have such
authority because of her joint control.
Id. at 2801. The Court, therefore, re-
manded the case for a determination as
to whether the police had sufficient
grounds to support a reasonable belief
that Fischer had authority to consent. Id.
at 2801. If on remand it was determined
that the police officers were reasonable
in believing that Fischer had authority,
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such a finding would be sufficient to
validate the entry. Id. at 2801.
The Court rejected Rodriguez's argu-
ment that permitting entry based on the
"reasonable belief' of common author-
ity vicariously waives a defendant's
fourth amendment rights. Id. The Court,
in rejecting this contention, de-empha-
sized Rodriguez's waiver of his fourth
amendment rights and highlighted the
reasonableness of the officers' belief in
Fischer's authority to consent. Id. at
2800. The Court stated that "at issue in a
claim where apparent consent is raised
is not whether the right to be free of
searches has been waived, but whether
the right to be free of unreasonable
searches has been violated." Id. at 2801
(emphasis original). Noting that the
fourth amendment is the source from
which Rodriguez's trial rights regarding
the exclusionary rule derives, the Court
reasoned that to violate a defendant's
rights against the admission of exclu-
sionary evidence, the fourth amendment
itself must first be violated. Id. In analyz-
ing whether a fourth amendment viola-
tion occurred, the Court reasoned that
the fourth amendment itself does not
assure that a government search of a
home will not occur, but assures only
that an "unreasonable" search will not
occur. Id. at 2799.
As the Court stated in Schencklotb v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973),
"[n]othing, either in the purposes be-
hind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelli-
gent' waiver of trial rights, or in the prac-
tical application of such a requirement
suggests that it ought to be extended to
the constitutional guarantee against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." Rod
riguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799 (1990) (quot-
ing Schnecklotb v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 241 (1973)). The Rodriguez Court,
therefore, reasoned that the fourth
amendment only guaranteed Rodriguez
protection against "unreasonable"
governmental searches, not freedom
from searches without his consent.
Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy dis-
sent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens. The dissent contended that a
search pursuant to an officer's reasona-
ble but erroneous belief that a third
party had authority to consent differs
from valid third party authority to con-
sent to governmental entry. Id. at 2802
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent
reasoned that giving a third party
authority to consent to entry limits an
owner's ability to challenge the rea-
sonableness of a search because allow-
ing another person access to or control
of property reduces an owner's expecta-
tion of privacy. Id. at 2802 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent believed that
where no actual relinquishment of access
or control occurs, and a third party lacks
actual authority to consent, there can-
not be an exception to the warrant
requirement because there would re-
main an expectation of privacy. Id. The
dissent reasoned that subjecting a per-
son to a warrantless search without
authorized consent or exigency would
erode the fourth amendment's protec-
tion of a home from "unreasonable"
governmental intrusion. Id. at 2807
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Rodriguez is significant in that it
broadens the third party consent excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for
entry into an individual's home. The
practical effect of the decision is that if a
third party convinces law enforcement
officials of his apparent authority to con-
sent to entry, no warrant for entry will
be required and thus, the homeowner's
expectation of privacy will be dimin-
ished. In addition, Rodriguez illustrates
the present Court's reluctance to res-
trict governmental action in drug related
cases.
- Daryl D. Jones
In re Moore: DEBTORS' INTERESTS
IN ERISA-QUALIFIED PROFIT-
SHARING AND PENSION PLAN
BEYOND THE REACH OF
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in In re Moore, 907
F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990) reconciled
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
with those of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§1001 et seq. (1976) (ERISA). The
court found that debtors' interests in an
ERISA-qualified profit-sharing and pen-
sion plan were not subject to turnover
to the trustee in bankrutpcy, because
ERISA constitutes applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law.
A number of employees of Springs
Industries who participated in their
company's comprehensive retirement
program became involved in Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings. The program's
Profit-Sharing and Pension Plan and
Trust and Retirement Plan and Trust
contained anti-assignment provisions
which prohibited the employees from
alienating their interests. The anti-
assignment provisions were necessary
to qualify the employees' interests in the
plans as ERISA funds and maintain their
tax-exempt status. Under the plans, dis-
tributions were to be made to benefi-
ciaries "only upon retirement, disability
or termination of service." Moore, 907
F.2d at 1477. The debtors had received
no distributions from the plans at the
time they petitioned for bankruptcy and
were not eligible to do so in the near
future.
The trustee in bankruptcy sought to
compel the Profit-Sharing and Pension
Plan and Trust administrator to turn
over the employees' interests to the
bankruptcy estates. The trustee argued
that the interests in the plan were not
subject to restrictions on transfer, be-
cause the plan was not a spendthrift
trust under South Carolina law. Without
addressing whether the plan was a spend-
thrift trust under South Carolina law, the
bankruptcy court determined that since
the plan was ERISA-qualified, the deb-
tors' interests in the plan were non-
alienable and thus excludable from the
bnkruptcyestates Thetusteeinbankutcy
appealed the decision. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit noted that under the
Bankruptcy Code, the property of a
bankrupt's estate consists of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of
the case." Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477 (cit-
ing 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1)). However,
the Code excludes the debtors' interests
in certain trusts from their bankruptcy
estates by recognizing restrictions on
transfers of such interests. Specifically,
"[a] restriction on the transfer of a bene-
ficial interest of the debtor in a trust that
is enforceable under applicable non-
bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.
§541 (c)(2)). Thus, if ERISA constitutes
applicable nonbankruptcy law, and the
debtors' interests are enforceable under
ERISA, the trustee would be precluded
from reaching those interests.
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
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